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ABSTRACT 
This paper chronicles Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic policies and economic development 
trends from the post independence period up to end of 2006. By focussing on monetary 
and exchange rate policies and their influence on economic developments before and 
after the reform programme in 1991, the paper attempts to reveal the critical 
macroeconomic policy underpinnings of Zimbabwe’s post-2000 economic tragedy. A key 
insight from the review is that despite what seemed to be concerted economic 
management efforts, the authorities actually never succeeded in attaining sustainable 
economic stabilization goals from the very start of the post-independence era. The 
constraints imposed by the inward looking policies of the 1980s and the eventual failure 
of ‘free market’ exchange rate policies of the early 1990s resulted in chronic real 
exchange rate overvaluation and depletion of foreign exchange reserves. This eventually 
culminated in the so-called “Black Friday” currency crash, and a severe foreign exchange 
crisis that has since been viewed as one of the most important factors that led to the 
economic tragedy. Hence in retrospect, the review concludes that the post-independence 
government in Zimbabwe never succeeded in bringing the economy into long term 
structural equilibrium and, thus failed to create an enabling environment for medium to 
long term macroeconomic policy sustainability.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Zimbabwe is a low-to-medium income developing country. Her economic performance is 
strongly influenced by manufacturing, agriculture, and mining sectors. By the early 
1990s, manufacturing accounted for 17 percent1 of real GDP and for more than 56 
percent of industrial output. The manufacturing sector has very strong backward and 
forward linkages with the rest of the economy.  
“The strength of the industrial sector is derived from the availability of foreign exchange, 
depicting the sector’s dependence on foreign inputs. The dearth of foreign currency has in general 
depressed production to below full capacity levels, a problem amplified by a high debt servicing 
ratio extracting over 20 percent of foreign exchange earnings. That shortage of foreign currency 
also reflects the underperformance of exports as a result of depressed demand (Ncube 1991: 6).”  
 
The construction sector is the least dependent on imports, hence its performance 
reflects, and may cause economic recession. In the 1980s, agriculture employed about 25 
percent of workers in formal employment while manufacturing accounted for 22 percent 
(Ncube 1991). The agricultural sector contributed about 22 percent of real GDP from 
1993-2002.2 It provided 70 percent of total employment3 and about 60 percent of all 
principal raw materials for manufacturing. About 40-45 percent of the country’s exports 
originated from agriculture (Bautista and Thomas 2000). The mining industry contributed 
about 3 percent of the country’s GDP, having declined from 8 percent in the 1980s. At 
that time, it accounted for about 6 percent of the labour force. Despite the relatively small 
composition of the sector in overall GDP, it was the second major foreign exchange 
earner, contributing 45 percent of the economy’s total foreign currency earnings. This 
reflects a very disproportionate contribution to foreign exchange earnings, in an economy 
that was highly dependent on imports. 
After the attainment of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe embraced two 
fundamentally distinct policy regimes. An inward-looking interventionist approach was 
in place during the 1980s. In 1991, the country shifted to a market-based policy approach 
– the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). However, despite the 
extensive policy initiatives under the auspices of ESAP, doubts have lingered concerning 
the extent to which these policy approaches managed to propel the economy in the 
intended direction. In particular, the ability of the policy mix to resolve the internal-
external imbalance that existed from the 1980s remains debatable. ESAP was formally 
abandoned in early 2002. 
This paper reviews Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic performance during these two 
policy phases. The key argument of the policy review is that despite concerted economic 
management efforts, the authorities never succeeded in attaining sustainable post-
independence economic goals. The constraints imposed by the inward looking policies of 
the 1980s and the failure of exchange rate policies resulted in chronic RER overvaluation. 
This culminated in a currency crisis that has been viewed as the trigger point of the 
macroeconomic crisis that developed from the late 1990s. While the political economy of 
                                                 
1
 GDP composition estimates are based on average for 1993-2002, using Central Statistics Office data. 
2
 While agriculture plays a predominant role in the growth and development of Zimbabwe’s economy, its 
share in GDP reflects low incomes received by farmers, particularly those in the semi-arid, low 
productivity communal and resettlement areas (Bautista and Thomas 2000). 
3
 About ¾ of the population reside in rural areas where agriculture is the dominant economic activity. 
Evolution of Zimbabwe’s Economic Tragedy 
 
3 
the crisis is not a subject of investigation in this paper, the study acknowledges the view 
that failure of economic management will eventually lead to social and political 
discontent. Such development may inevitably culminate in a fully fledged political crisis 
that has further negative feedbacks on the real economy. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 discusses the evolution of 
the macroeconomic policy framework from the post-independence import substitution 
strategies, leading up to economic reforms of the 1990s. Section 3 documents the 
evolution of monetary policies, with emphasis on exchange rate management. This 
section provides a review of the country’s exchange policy leading up to the currency 
crisis of 1997 and the eventual collapse of the free market currency reforms. Section 4 
then discusses some key elements of the crisis that include the external sector, aggregate 
domestic output as well as the emergence of hyperinflation. In section 5, the main 
elements of government’s policy response are discussed, with the analysis revealing a 
dramatic turnaround particularly in monetary and exchange rate policy strategies. Section 
6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Macroeconomic Policy Overview 
 
2.1 The Inward Looking Policy Era: 1980 – 1991 
 
Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence in 1980 came with bright prospects and high 
optimism for its economic future, both at home and abroad (Green and Khadani, 1986).  
The end of sanctions was thought likely to improve both the terms of trade and market access for 
exports. More external finance - including aid - would further augment import capacity, thus 
relieving the economy of the capacity utilization, capital stock maintenance, and renewal and new 
investment constraints of the preceding Rhodesian era. Excess capacity existed to allow more 
production and past and expected increases in grower prices and wages were likely to provide the 
markets for the greater output (pp 1059–1060). 
The new government tried to consolidate these prospects by adopting a socialist-
based economic policy approach. Its prime goal was to use state intervention to redirect 
development for the equitable benefit of the mass population. This policy framework was 
underpinned by inward looking strategies that had been motivated by the imposition of 
sanctions against the country in response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965. A key facet of this strategy was to expand domestic production and 
employment through import-substitution industrialization. The import substitution 
strategy involved a high degree of indirect and direct controls over productive activities.  
Among the controls, foreign exchange allocation was the most important policy 
instrument that guided short- and long-term decisions of enterprises in the private and 
public sectors. The government administratively allocated foreign exchange to firms for 
working capital and investment purposes. Allocations were based on the assessed 
availability of global foreign exchange, historical allocations, specific assessments of the 
current needs of individual enterprises, and predominantly on the perceived priorities of 
the economy. The government enforced price controls and financial resource 
mobilization instruments that included controlled interest rates and credit rationing. In 
addition to administering wage controls, the state also directly participated in production 
and service industries.  
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The economy experienced a boom during the first few years of independence 
under import substitution. Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by more than 11 
percent in 1980 and by about 13 percent in 1981. Capacity utilization increased from 75 
to 95 percent while exports increased by 23 percent (Green and Khadani, 1986). 
Conditions for significant economic growth and strong trade performance were facilitated 
by favorable weather, increased employment and wages, expansive fiscal policy and 
improvements in income distribution (Riddell 1984). The removal of sanctions as well as 
the build-up of optimism and increased consumer confidence at the end of the war of 
liberation improved the country’s terms of trade (Davies and Rattso, 1996). The resultant 
boom in domestic demand was reflected in an escalating index of retail sales. The index 
almost doubled from 1979 to 1981. Prior to that period, it had taken eight of the previous 
years to expand by the same proportion (Riddell, 1994). 
This however turned out to be a brief post-independence boom followed by 
stagnating per capita incomes and worsening income distribution (Davies and Rattso, 
1996). It emerged that during 1982-84 the economy had already been suffering from very 
serious imbalances. The post-independence growth rate turned out to be unsustainable on 
government and external balance accounts. The cumulative effect of the boom had driven 
the current account into deeper deficit –with a three-fold deterioration over three years, 
from Z$157 million in 1980 to Z$533 million in 1982 (Green and Khadani 1986). The 
world recession in 1982 combined with the droughts of 1982, 1983 and 1984 amplified 
the pressures on the external account. The government responded by occasionally 
imposing wage restraints, gazetting grower prices that were less than cost increases for 
large-scale farmers and cutting food subsidies. Sharp increases in electric power rates 
were instituted, albeit with limited attention to the cost of production of export sectors. 
Monetary policy was tightened and foreign exchange allocations for visible imports in 
respect of goods financed out of export earnings were sharply curtailed (Ibid). 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth 1980-1990 
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Data Source: World Bank Database 
 
The outcome was that the growth of export volumes averaged 2 percent per 
annum in 1985-1989 while imports increased by 1.3 percent per annum. Export volumes 
grew at just about 4 percent per annum throughout the 1980s, unaffected by the 
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introduction of export-promoting measures in the middle of that decade. The resulting 
decline in foreign exchange earnings saw government enforcing import compression 
through severe cuts in foreign exchange allocations for intermediate imports. In so doing, 
policy intervention secured external “equilibrium” at the high cost of starving the 
economy of essential imports and, hence, at the expense of local production (Davies and 
Rattso 1996). This led to a contraction of domestic output and re-idling of capacity, and 
deterioration of the external balance. Government revenues declined with the unfolding 
depression, compromising the ability to maintain current and future budgetary stringency. 
The strategy of economic controls and import compression failed to generate the 
employment growth needed to keep pace with population growth. The external account 
deterioration that had begun in 1982 was followed by a growth slowdown in the mid-
1980s. Over the entire decade 1980-89 average real GDP grew by 5 percent compared to 
a population growth rate of 3.5 percent. Per capita incomes thus increased only 
marginally, and the ability to sustain the redistributive policies by means of subsidies and 
social services became increasingly questionable (Ibid.). Overall, although Zimbabwe 
had emerged from independence with a strong growth thrust, the failure to respond 
appropriately to the prevalence of adverse domestic and external shocks drove the 
economy deeper into long-term structural disequilibrium.  
 
2.2. Inward Looking Policies and the External Balance 
 
The foreign exchange allocation system which was at the core of the inward-
looking policies had an adverse influence on the overall structure of prices and pattern of 
production. Competition for access to foreign exchange for imports became a major 
preoccupation for enterprises in all sectors of the economy. Established enterprises were 
favoured by the allocation system at the expense of new firms, resulting in high degrees 
of product concentration. This restricted domestic as well as international competition 
(Ndlela and Duravall 2000). The volume of exports was limited not only by the exchange 
rate but also by the system of administrative foreign exchange allocation. Hence, an 
improvement in the external account balance tended to reflect the effectiveness of the 
restrictions on imports and domestic contraction rather than an improvement in 
productive conditions and competitiveness (Davies and Ratso 1996).  
 
Table 1: The Savings – Investment Balance: 1980 – 1988 (% of GDP) 
Year 
Private Fixed 
Investment 
Public Fixed 
Investment 
Changes in 
Stocks Private savings Public Savings 
Current Account 
Deficit 
1980 10.6 4.7 3.5 19.7 -5.4 -4.5 
1981 13.4 5.3 4.4 12.7 0.5 -9.9 
1982 10.1 9.9 1.2 12 -1.1 -10.3 
1983 8 11.6 -3.7 5.1 3.6 -7.2 
1984 8.7 9.8 0.4 17.7 -0.4 -1.6 
1985 6.4 9.1 4.3 21.8 -4.2 -2.2 
1986 8.5 7.2 2.7 21.1 -2.5 0.2 
1987 9.9 8.1 -1.4 19.6 -2.1 0.9 
1988 9.8 8.8 4.2 26.7 -2 1.9 
Source: Davies and Rattso (1996) 
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Foreign exchange rationing contributed to declining investment levels throughout 
the 1980s. Private sector fixed investment fell from 13.4 percent of GDP in 1981 to 6.4 
percent in 1985. The current account deficit worsened from 4.5 percent of GDP in 1980 
to 10.3 percent in 1982, before gradually improving during the second half of the decade. 
The use of import rationing to maintain external balance also caused private savings to 
reach historically high levels in excess of 15-20 percent of GDP during the second half of 
the 1980s.  
Public sector investment cuts, initiated in 1983 as a response to the public sector 
deficit, led to a decrease in the demand for imported capital goods. This allowed more 
foreign exchange to be allocated to intermediate goods and hence raised capacity 
utilization. The current account balance in turn improved from a deficit of 2.2 percent of 
GDP in 1985 to a surplus of about 2 percent in 1988. With the current account 
improvement achieved through import compression and foreign exchange allocation, it 
was increasingly apparent that the economic goal of achieving an acceptable primary 
income distribution was failing. The ability to sustain the redistributive policies through 
subsidies and social services in the presence of foreign exchange constraints became 
more questionable (Ibid.). Even though the foreign exchange allocation mechanism was 
meant to save foreign currency, the amount saved was outweighed by the amount lost 
through bureaucratic delays and inefficiency in the system (Ncube 1991).  
 
2.3. The Transition to Structural Adjustment Policies 
 
As an acknowledgement that the regulatory regime was not sustainable, the government 
moved to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1991. This shift 
in policy was meant to pave the way for the liberalization of the economy and to 
encourage a surge of domestic and foreign investment. The structural reforms had notable 
effect in the areas of domestic deregulation, liberalization of current account transactions 
and financial sector reforms. However, progress in public enterprise reform and fiscal 
rationalization was slow. Trade liberalisation involved, amongst other initiatives, the 
progressive transfer of imports to the Open General Import Licence, tariff adjustment, 
increasing the foreign exchange retention thresholds and relaxing exchange controls to 
allow for the free importation of goods. Domestic deregulation involved the phasing out 
of price controls, the liberalisation of the marketing of agricultural produce as well as 
removal of wage controls.  
While ESAP ushered in a flexible framework for adjustable and progressive 
reform of the economy, the first few years of the reform did not live up to expectations. 
The introduction of the program coincided with the region’s most severe drought in 
living memory in 1991-92. The need for massive drought relief imports led to an 
unprecedented and unsustainable growth in imports, financed by domestic and external 
borrowing. At the same time, export values contracted by 14.3 percent, reflecting the 
impact of the drought on the predominantly agriculturally dependent and agro-based 
manufacturing exports. As a result, the current account balance worsened to a deficit of 
12 percent of GDP. Real exports recovered after the drought. They kept improving, albeit 
modestly to reach a peak growth rate of 20.9 percent in 1994. The current account deficit 
steadily improved from US$842 million in 1992 to US$180 million in 1996. Gross 
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international reserves marginally recovered from 1.7 to 3.7 weeks import cover in late 
1995 (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Selected Balance of Payments Indicators (US$ Million): 1991-1998 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Current account balance 
(excluding official transfers) -547 -842 -311 -317 -369 -180 -801 -372 
Trade balance 58 -251 98 169 88 249 -230 -95 
Exports, f.o.b 1758 1530 1610 1947 2216 2496 2424 1925 
Imports, f.o.b -1700 -1781 -1512 -1778 -2128 -2247 -2654 -2020 
Capital account (including 
official transfers) 533 645 535 517 437 109 102 560 
Overall Balance -126 -171 207 268 210 -21 -739 -41 
Financing -126 171 -207 -268 -210 21 740 41 
Gross official reserves  
(- increase) -83 -22 -216 -232 -254 30 558 64 
Arrears (- decrease)        0 
Memorandum items:         
Gross official international 
reserves 371 393 609 584 882 830 272 55 
In months of goods and 
services 1.7 1.7 3.1 2.8 3.7 2.9 0.9 0.3 
Current account balance (in 
percent of GDP)-2 -6.3 -12.5 -4.7 -4.6 -4.8 -2.1 -9.6 -4 
Source: IMF Statistical Appendices 
 
Despite the mid-1990s recovery, the external balance experienced a negative 
turnaround in 1997. The current account balance sharply contracted from a deficit of 
US$180 million to US$801 million (9.6 percent of GDP). International reserves also 
crashed by 67 percent to end the year at US$272 million, in developments that signalled 
an imminent economic crisis. These untimely developments coincided with the beginning 
of the currency crisis in November 1997. Real GDP growth followed a trend similar to 
exports in the first few years of ESAP. The cyclical growth pattern (Figure 2) clearly 
illustrates that despite attaining a peak growth rate of 10.4 percent in 1996, the economy 
never achieved a sustained stable growth path. Much of the fluctuation in growth was 
related to the performance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The sharp 
decline in growth in 1997 followed a period of rising domestic inflation and growing 
instability in the foreign exchange market. 
The analysis of economic developments during the two policy eras shows that 
despite the economy going full circle in terms of both non-market and market based 
policy approaches, it failed to achieve the primary goals of growth and equitable income 
distribution. Like the short-lived post independence boom period, post ESAP growth was 
only sustained for four years in 1992-1998. This experience may, however, not 
necessarily be a refutation of the appropriateness of the deregulationist policy regime. 
Rather, it could be the improper sequencing of ESAP policies, the failure to deal with the 
fundamental structural constraints that had been inherited from the colonial economy, and 
unfavourable weather conditions, that compromised the progress of reforms.  
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Figure 2: Real GDP Growth (1991 – 1997) 
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Data Source: World Bank Database 
 
3. Exchange Rate Policy Developments 
 
3.1 Evolution of Exchange Rate Management 
 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1973, the then 
Rhodesian dollar was pegged to the South African Rand (SAR) and to a basket of 
currencies. In 1980, the government adopted a transaction-weighted basket consisting of 
five major currencies with a larger weight given to the US dollar. The fixed exchange rate 
regime was supported by the foreign exchange allocation mechanism and controls on 
prices and interest rates. Administered exchange rate adjustment was done in response to 
balance of payments disequilibria and to maintain competitiveness. Foreign currency for 
both current and capital account transactions was also rationed as a means of achieving a 
favourable external balance.  
With the embrace of market reforms under ESAP the administrative foreign 
exchange allocation system was terminated (Ndlela, Sikwila and Dliwayo; 2000). A 
floating exchange rate was adopted and all controls on foreign trade were lifted. 
Institutions and mechanisms for foreign exchange controls were abolished. Trade 
liberalization and the elimination of exchange controls under exchange rate policy 
reforms meant that agents could import goods according to their requirements. The 
introduction of a market determined exchange rate system was also accompanied by the 
lifting of controls on investment and the financial sector.  
The transition from the pegged exchange arrangements to a managed float 
proceeded in two phases. The RBZ first adopted a two-tier exchange rate system in 
January 1994. In the two-tier system, the old official exchange rate was to run 
concurrently with the new market rate. The system was abandoned within six months in 
favour of a single market determined rate as it was felt the gap between the official and 
market rates had reduced sufficiently to warrant a single exchange rate. To facilitate the 
operation of the market-based exchange rate regime, the role of the RBZ was limited to 
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indirect intervention to maintain the rate within prescribed band margins and to ensure 
efficient operation of the market.  
Money was used as a nominal anchor for price stabilization while the exchange 
rate was allowed to adjust in order to meet international reserve targets. Companies and 
individuals were permitted to open foreign currency accounts (FCAs) and to transact 
freely in foreign exchange at the market-determined exchange rate. As exchange control 
regulations were progressively relaxed, allowances for business and holiday travel, 
education and health care were increased. In line with regional developments, foreign 
exchange bureaus were authorized to operate. Private sector companies were also allowed 
to borrow up to US$5 million offshore without RBZ approval. In July 1994, exporters 
were authorized to retain 100 percent of their export earnings (Ibid.).  
 
3.2. The Currency Crisis of 1997 
 
Despite embracing a market approach to exchange rate policy in 1992, the “fear 
of floating” phenomenon was clearly evident in the way the official rate was managed. 
Heavy intervention ensured minimal variation of the nominal exchange rate, while the 
RER was characterized by large swings. As illustrated in Figure  34 , the REER 
depreciated by 33 percent between January and October 1991 (36 percent for the bilateral 
RER). A steep appreciation occurred between October 1991 and December 1992, owing 
to high drought-induced inflation. Both RER indicators, however, appear to depreciate to 
reach a peak in February 1994. They then continuously appreciated (by up to about 35 
percent on average). In August 1997, the REER was equivalent to its January 1991 level. 
This persistent appreciation of the RER led many analysts to conclude that the Zimbabwe 
dollar was highly overvalued, particularly towards the third quarter of 1997. Empirical 
studies reported rates of overvaluation that ranged between 20 and 40 percent in 1995-
1997 (Ndlela et al 2000, IMF 2003, IMF 2005a). 
The exchange rate developments during the initial years of ESAP positively 
illustrate that the government failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that monetary 
and fiscal policies should be consistent with the chosen nominal exchange rate regime. 
Violation of this consistency requirement results in severe economic disequilibrium 
which usually becomes manifest in RER misalignment (Edwards 1989). The experience 
of Zimbabwe illustrates that the exchange rate remained heavily managed while high 
government spending created excessive monetary expansion. Progress towards fiscal 
reform was also compromised by the drought of 1991-92. This led to a much higher 
deficit than had been projected. Consequently, broad money growth increased to 94 
percent as of December 1993. 
The exchange rate developments during the initial years of ESAP positively 
illustrate that the government failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that monetary 
and fiscal policies should be consistent with the chosen nominal exchange rate regime. 
Violation of this consistency requirement results in severe economic disequilibrium 
which usually becomes manifest in RER misalignment (Edwards 1989). The experience 
of Zimbabwe illustrates that the exchange rate remained heavily managed while high 
government spending created excessive monetary expansion. Progress towards fiscal 
                                                 
4
 The RER indices are quoted in domestic currency terms (direct quotation). An increase in the value of the 
index represents a depreciation while a decrease is an appreciation. 
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reform was also compromised by the drought of 1991-92. This led to a much higher 
deficit than had been projected. Consequently, broad money growth increased to 94 
percent as of December 1993.  
 
Figure 3: Real and Bilateral Real Exchange Rates: 1991 – 19975 
 
Source: REER indices obtained from the IMF, Bilateral RER computed using IFS data 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate, official reserves, 
money supply growth, and inflation during ESAP. The inconsistency in fiscal and 
monetary policy, especially credit expansion through bank financing of the budget 
deficit, persistently undermined the effort by the RBZ to exercise firm monetary control. 
Monetary expansion averaged above 30 percent per annum between 1991 and 1997. In 
1994 alone, it was 60 percent. Overall, although trade and exchange rate reforms 
implemented under ESAP had enabled easier and increased access to foreign exchange, 
the thinness of the market and the lack of appropriate institutional prudence to manage 
the new system culminated in the currency crisis of 1997 (Ndlela et al 2000).  
On November 14, 1997, the Zimbabwe dollar lost almost one fourth of its value in 
local currency terms. In a day that has come to be known as ‘black Friday’ the currency 
first collapsed by 47.5 percent, from Z$12.6 to Z$24 per US$. It was restored to around 
Z$18 to the US dollar by the end of the day through RBZ intervention.  
This experience epitomises an inflexible approach to exchange rate management, which 
results in the persistence over time of an appreciated real exchange rate. During the lead-up 
to the crisis, there was a tendency to confuse the appreciated exchange rate with exchange 
rate stability. This perception continued even after the level of gross foreign reserves fell 
sharply during the six-months to the end of the first quarter of 1997. The appropriate 
response to this fall in reserves would have been to encourage a more flexible adjustment of 
the exchange rate while tightening monetary policy. Neither of these two remedies was 
adopted when reserves began to fall, possibly because the authorities believed that the fall in 
reserves was temporary. However, monetary policy was progressively tightened since mid-
1997, after it became obvious that reserves would not recover (Ndlela et al 2000: 3). 
 
                                                 
5
 An increase in the RER represents a depreciation while a decrease in a real appreciation 
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A combination of events together with the perception that the currency was highly 
overvalued eventually precipitated the ultimate breakdown of confidence in the market. 
These included the awarding of huge unbudgeted war veterans’ gratuities and pensions 
that the government could not afford, the controversial military engagement in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the perception that reserves had declined to 
unsustainably low levels.  
 
Figure 4: Nominal Exchange Rate and Selected Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
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Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database 
The response of the authorities to ‘black Friday’ also worsened the crisis 
(Robinson 2001). In addition to restoring the nominal exchange rate to a level which was 
still overvalued, exporters were deprived of the right to maintain foreign currency 
denominated accounts. The export proceeds repatriation period was reduced from 180 to 
90 days. “Emergency” tariffs were imposed on various commodities, distorting the 
protection structure without measurable benefit to exporters (Ibid.). Additional measures 
included the raising of the rediscount rate and tightening of restrictions on foreign 
exchange holdings of authorized dealers.  
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Figure 5 illustrates the nominal exchange rate after the currency crash. The rate 
was still appreciating within the first 2 months of 1998 as the RBZ continued its frantic 
intervention efforts. By end of the first quarter of 1998, speculative pressures on the 
currency were clearly overwhelming. Despite an artificially steady trend that lasted for 4 
months, a series of crashes was imminent. With the seemingly counter-effective 
measures, the exchange rate crashed again by about 49 percent between July and 
November 1998. At that time the RBZ had run out of reserves and was unable to defend 
the currency. The floating regime was abandoned and replaced by a super-fixed regime in 
which the exchange rate was fixed at Z$38/US$. After a brief crawling peg, the rate was 
eventually fixed rate at Z$55/US$ in November 2000. It remained at that level for 28 
months until a 98 percent devaluation lifted it to Z$824 against in February 2003. 
 
Figure 5: Official Nominal Exchange Rate: 1998 – 2003 
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Data Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
 
3.3. The Parallel Market for Foreign Exchange 
 
Foreign exchange shortages and the balance of payment crisis deepened after the 
currency crash. The RBZ responded by further tightening exchange control measures. As 
a result, the parallel market premium started gradually to increase. Before the currency 
crash, the premium had steadily declined from about 70 percent in 1991 to about 12 
percent in December 1997. Despite increasing to about 24 percent in August 1998, the 
premium had subsequently subsided. It ranged between 4-10 percent from September 
1998 to end of 1999, before increasing to a peak of 57 percent between May and July in 
the run up to the parliamentary elections of June 2000.  
The parallel market grew rapidly in size and dominance. From about 9 percent in 
December 2000, the premium sharply increased to 120 percent in June 2001. At that 
stage, the nominal official exchange rate had only become relevant for official 
transactions, such as debt service and the importation of liquid fuels and electricity. 
Almost all other transactions were conducted at the parallel market rate (Robinson 2001). 
Even though it was illegal, the parallel market was tolerated by the authorities and 
operated in a quasi-official way by the banks.  
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Figure 6: The Parallel Market Premium: 1999 – 2006 
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Attempts to curb the parallel market by tightening exchange controls had a 
devastating impact on export receipts and only exacerbated the increase in the premium. 
In particular, the highly restrictive exchange control requirements squeezed the limited 
foreign exchange available, and the premium increased to 450 percent by end 2001. It 
reached an astounding 2625 percent by December 2002 (Figure 6). While private 
companies and individuals also relied on the parallel market to meet their foreign 
currency needs, it was the participation of major state entities that precipitated sharp 
increases in the premium (IMF 2003). 
A maxi-devaluation of 93.3 percent led to a temporary appreciation of parallel 
market rates in February 2003. The premium declined from about 2400 percent to about 
60 percent in March 2003 as the majority of exports moved to informal channels (Ibid.). 
The effect was, however, short-lived. By the end of 2003, the premium had recovered to 
about 650 percent. This prompted the authorities to take urgent measures that culminated 
in the introduction of a managed foreign exchange auction in January 2004. 
The launch of the auction sharply reduced the premium to about 30 percent. In 
May – June 2004, it was a negative, -4.5 percent. Although such periods of negative 
premium may be difficult to justify theoretically, in practice they may be rationalised by 
Evolution of Zimbabwe’s Economic Tragedy 
 
14 
the fact that the emergence of a significant negative premium can be associated with 
expectations of revaluation of the official exchange rate (Agenor 1992).  
A negative premium may also emerge during periods when exchange controls 
restrict commercial banks from buying foreign currency from exporters without proper 
identification of the seller. In such circumstances, a negative premium represents a 
“laundering charge” paid by agents who have no legal rights to the foreign currency they 
are offering for sale (Ibid.). The fluctuations in the premium in 2004 reflect the response 
to stringent exchange controls and rigid exchange rate management. After an initial 
increase of about 30 percent, the premium had sharply increased to about 230 percent in 
mid 2005. A brief slowdown to about 40 percent was initiated by an official devaluation. 
However, by end of 2005, it had again reached levels of up to 300 percent 
 
4. Towards Full-Scale Economic Crisis 
 
4.1 The External Balance Collapse 
 
After the currency crash, trade contraction and a foreign aid freeze induced by political 
instability led to a rapid deterioration of the country’s external position and intensified 
the foreign currency crisis. Balance of payments support by multilateral agencies was 
also suspended owing to failure to meet performance targets and mounting political 
instability. Private capital flows, largely consisting of foreign investment and long- and 
short-term capital inflows, declined substantially as investor confidence collapsed. As a 
result, the capital account deteriorated sharply between 1998 and 2000 (Table 3). Gross 
international reserves also collapsed from US$55 million in 1998 to US$16 million 2001, 
equivalent to only three days import cover.  
 
Table 3: Selected External Indicators 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041 
Current account balance 
(excluding official transfers) -372 47 -38 -82 -213 -346 -421 
Trade balance -95 249 293 323 -19 -151 -309 
Exports, f.o.b 1925 1924 2200 2114 1802 1670 1680 
Imports, f.o.b -2020 -1675 -1907 -1791 -1821 -1821 -1989 
Capital account (including official 
transfers) 560 143 -227 -386 -317 -210 -170 
Overall Balance -41 -37 -135 -177 -456 -476 247 
Financing  41 37 135 177 456 476 247 
Gross official reserves 
 (- increase) 64 8 25 6 1 1 9 
Arrears (- decrease) 0 114 281 292 570 443 240 
Gross official international 
reserves 55 47 22 16 15 16 16 
Import cover (months) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 01 
CAB (in percent of GDP)2 -4 0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -2.6 -4.6 -5.7 
Total Arrears 9 123 404 803 1520 2141 2584 
Total Debt 4466 4321 4014 3845 4370 4843 4960 
Source: IMF Statistical Appendices (2005) 
1/ IMF Estimates, 2/ Year End Usable Reserves 
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Sustained exchange rate overvaluation and structural distortions in major export 
sectors, particularly in the agricultural sector, resulted in exports declining from 30.3 per 
cent of GDP in 2000 to 9.6 per cent in 2001. The cumulative decline in export receipts 
from 1996 to 2001 was 37 percent. This critically impaired the ability of the economy to 
acquire essential imports. Total imports fell from 31.4 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 16 per 
cent in 2002 (AFDB/OECD, 2004). Real export earnings declined by 18 percent during 
the same period. The current account deficit increased from about 0.4 percent of GDP in 
2000 to about 6 percent in 2004. Without any foreign financing or usable reserves, this 
deficit was financed by an accumulation of arrears. Hence, by mid-1999 the government 
had defaulted on most of its external debts. Arrears (on both public and private sector 
debt) amounted to 2.8 percent of total external debt, or US$123 million, at end of 2002. 
They escalated to US$2.58 billion or 52 percent of external debt by end of 2004. Total 
external debt in 2004 was equivalent to 3 years of exports at current levels.  
 
4.2 The Growth Slowdown 
 
Real GDP growth sharply declined from a peak of 10.4 percent in 1996 to 0.5 percent in 
1998 in the aftermath of the 1997 currency crisis (Table 4). The economy contracted by 
an average 5 percent per annum during 1999-2002, and by 10 percent in 2003. Of the key 
sectors, manufacturing contracted by about 13 per cent in 2002 and a further 14 per cent 
in 2003. The fall in capacity utilisation to an all-time low of 55 per cent in 2003 (from 
about 60 per cent in 2002) was attributed to shrinking domestic demand and low export 
competitiveness (AFDB 2004). 
Industrial production, which relies heavily on imports, was badly hit by acute 
foreign currency shortages. As a result, output of non-metallic minerals fell 40 percent, 
food 30 percent, textiles 26 percent, wood and furniture 20 percent and transport 
equipment 12 per cent (Ibid.) Agriculture, on the other hand, declined by 22 percent in 
2002, reflecting the repercussions of the government’s fast-track land reforms. The 
cumulative decline in real GDP from 1999 to 2004 was about 32.6 percent in real terms. 
In total, manufacturing and agricultural sectors contracted by 57.9 and 24.6 percent over 
the same period. However, it was the construction sector that suffered the most severe 
impact, recording negative growth of 35 and 42 percent in 2001-2002 and a cumulative 
contraction of 122.3 percent in 1999-2004. 
Lack of foreign currency meant exporting and even non-exporting companies that wanted 
to import new capital, raw materials, and spare parts were forced to seek foreign 
exchange on the parallel market. This resulted in cash flows being strained by the 
substantial parallel market exchange premium. The transport sector, which had been 
crippled by fuel shortages, was also unable to refurbish and replace obsolete capital let 
alone to expand to meet demand. This forced companies that relied heavily on 
transportation of raw materials to close down or sharply scale down operations. 
According to the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (2004) survey, 840 
manufacturing companies closed down in 2000 - 2004, with heavy loss of employment. 
In addition, 60 percent of companies had no planned investment in 2002-03. This turn of 
events with respect to economic growth was a clear illustration that the economy was in a 
severe recession. The economic base of the country was disintegrating and so were the 
underlying standards of living and the socio-political environment.  
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Table 4: Gross Domestic Product, Percentage (Constant 1990 Prices) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Percentage Change at Constant 1990 Prices 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 2.3 3.6 3.2 -3.9 -22.7 -1.0 -2.9 
Mining and quarrying 8.4 -7 -6.9 -13.5 2.2 -28.7 24.9 
Manufacturing -3.4 -4.5 -11.5 -5.4 -13.2 -13.8 -9.5 
Electricity and Water -4.3 7.6 -1.0 10.3 6.2 1.5 -1.5 
Construction 6 -11.1 -15.0 -35.2 -41.0 -15.5 -4.5 
Finance and Insurance 6.2 -4.5 0.8 -1.2 -21.2 -23.7 -3.0 
Real Estate 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.2 3.9 2.2 -5.0 
Distribution, hotels and restaurants 0.8 0.4 -8.8 -5.2 -4.5 -30.8 -4.3 
transport and communications -11 -3.7 -6.3 -5.5 -1.0 -8.1 -5.5 
Public administration -3 -4.8 -6.2 4.7 2.0 2.1 -4.5 
Education 6.8 -8 3.7 5.9 1.0 -0.7 -4.0 
Health 6.6 14.5 -7.6 17.8 -13.0 1.4 -5.5 
Domestic services -1.1 -6.3 -5.0 5.7 2.5 0.4 -2.5 
other services 2.2 7.4 -2.1 -2.7 1.8 1.8 -5.5 
Less: imputed bank service charges 37.4 13.9 13.9 0.0 -24.8 -25.6 -15.5 
GDP at Factor cost -0.8 -2.1 -5.4 -3.4 -4.8 -10.8 -3.4 
Net other taxes on production 39.4 -16.2 -17.1 -23.7 -43.6 -71.6 -25.0 
GDP at basic prices -0.7 -2.2 -6.1 -3.5 -4.9 -10.9 -3.5 
Net taxes on products 10.8 -14.7 -24 6.7 0.6 -5.4 -10.5 
GDP at market prices 0.5 -3.6 -7.3 -2.7 -4.4 -10.4 -4.2 
In Percent of GDP 
Private Fixed Investment 18.9 12.1 10 5.7 4 1.2 -- 
Public Fixed Investment 1.7 1.4 0.6 1.6 1.5 2.0 -- 
Changes in Stocks 0.1 1.8 2.5 -1.7 -14.3 -16.2 -- 
Private savings 14.6 18.2 28.2 6.0 -11.9 -17.0 -- 
Public Savings -1.2 -5.7 -18.1 -6.6 -1.2 2.1 -- 
Source: IMF Statistical Appendices (2005). 
 
4.3. The Emergence of Hyperinflation 
 
The emergence of hyperinflation has been linked to excessive monetary expansion and 
rapid depreciation of the currency, particularly on the parallel market. From 1998, the 
government’s increased reliance on bank credit led to high levels of credit expansion that 
were unrelated to productive economic activity. Significant increases in civil service 
allocations and other expenditures in the run-up to the elections in June 2000, together 
with the strain of defence spending due to military involvement in the DRC conflict6 and 
a surge in interest payments, pushed the budget deficit to 18 percent of GDP by 2000. As 
a result, monetary growth averaged 61 percent in 1999 and reached 60 percent in 
December 2000. Inflation increased from 70 percent in October 1999 to 100 percent in 
November 2001, before reaching 200 percent by December 2002. 
In attempts to stabilize prices, the government announced a temporary price 
freeze in November 2002. Under the measures: (i) prices of commodities would remain 
fixed for a period of six months subject to a previously announced order of October 2001; 
(ii) the freeze was extended to cover a broader spectrum of goods, including some 
beverages, all household utensils and equipment, new cars, and entertainment services; 
                                                 
6
 According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (2004), Zimbabwe spent an estimated US$250 million in the 
DRC involvement. 
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and (iii) the rebranding and repackaging of items to avoid price controls was prohibited. 
The new control measures resulted in 70 percent of items in the consumer price index 
(CPI) being subject to administered pricing (IMF 2004). This administered pricing 
system, however, did little to halt the hyperinflation. In fact, most basic commodities 
disappeared from shelves and black market trading of goods thrived.  
 
Figure 7: Annual Inflation: 1999-2006 
 
Inflation: 1998:1-2006:12
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Data Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
 
Inflationary pressures further increased with the growing impact of currency 
depreciation, foreign exchange shortages, acute shortages of goods spurred by 
administered pricing, and the sharp contraction in domestic production. At the same time, 
the growth in money supply, driven by quasi-fiscal operations of the RBZ and 
government borrowing, increased to some 455 percent in 2004.  
This was followed by a drastic increase in inflation of more than 400 percentage 
points within one year to reach 622.2 percent in January 2004. Inflation subsequently 
decelerated to 130 percent at end of 2004 in response to a tighter regulatory environment 
and administered foreign exchange allocation. However, in mid 2005, the upward spiral 
resumed and continued without restraint. It reached 1000 percent in June 2006, ending 
the year at 1280 percent. In all, the government tried to institute a number of frantic 
policy measures in attempts to control the unfolding crisis. Of particular interest and 
relevance to the understanding of the impact of RER misalignment is the monetary policy 
response.  
 
5. Monetary and Exchange rate Policy Response to the Crisis 
 
5.2. Interest Rate Policy Response  
 
The RBZ tried to use interest rates as one of the main market instruments for foreign 
exchange market stabilization. The market rates were largely influenced by the RBZ 
rediscount rate (later replaced by the bank rate in 2000) and the short-term Treasury Bill 
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(TB) rate. Use of interest rates to ease demand pressures on the overvalued exchange rate 
and to control rising inflation caused rates to triple over two years, rising from about 25 
percent at the end of 1997 to exceed 70 percent by the end of 1999. However, without 
any reserves to back the currency in the presence of a growing parallel market, the rise in 
interest rates fuelled money market speculation and crowded out productive investment.  
The use of interest rates to stabilize exchange rates during a currency crisis has 
been justified in terms of its potential to curb acute capital flight. The conventional ‘flow’ 
view of cross-border capital movements holds that higher interest rates raise the yields on 
domestic assets and attract capital inflows or discourage capital outflows. Increasing 
interest rates also makes it very costly for speculators to take short positions in the 
currency under attack, thereby discouraging speculation in the foreign exchange market. 
Tight monetary policy is further perceived as a signal of the commitment of the monetary 
authorities towards defending the currency. This may restore confidence and avert further 
speculation (Backus and Driffil 1985).  
On the other hand, some economists oppose this view (Stiglitz and Furman, 1998, 
Radelet and Sachs 1998, Goderis and Ioannidou, 2006). Instead, they argue that raising 
interest rates during a crisis may further weaken the currency. This is because increasing 
interest rates can worsen the financial position of debtors, inducing bankruptcies and 
increasing the probability of default. This may in turn affect the firms' creditors and the 
health of the banking sector. The outcome could be a credit crunch that worsens the 
financial situation, resulting in capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation.  
Furthermore, higher default probabilities and riskiness may offset the enhanced 
attractiveness of investment in local currency-denominated assets and discourage foreign 
investors. Reactions to the enhanced riskiness of particular classes of assets may well 
increase the probability that a speculative attack develops into a currency crisis. 
Moreover, interest rates have to be increased to very high levels in order to make 
domestic investment attractive (Goderis and Ioannidou 2006).  
Failure of the interest defence led the RBZ to loosen monetary policy in 
September 2000. To provide a low interest environment to stimulate productive sector 
borrowing, banks were authorised to use statutory reserves to issue loans at preferential 
rates (15 and 30 percent) to exporters and the productive sectors, respectively. Monetary 
policy was further loosened in January 2001 when the RBZ redeemed all maturing short-
term TBs. This led to a sharp increase in liquidity and a precipitous decline in interest 
rates. The reference 91 day TB rate crashed from around 55 percent to 12 percent. An 
increase in inflation from 57 percent in January 2001 to 112 percent by mid-year led to 
real interest rates becoming highly negative (up to -80 percent).  
While the RBZ maintained a rule of keeping the bank rate at 2-2.5 percent above 
the inflation rate, it did not serve any purpose, as banks do not need to borrow from the 
Central Bank in a liquid market. The rule was implicitly abandoned towards mid 2001. 
While interest rates had closely followed the bank rate for a long time, in 2001 the 
situation changed drastically. The bank rate was rendered an ineffective monetary policy 
tool. The excess liquidity, together with the low interest rates, perfected the conditions 
under which foreign exchange arbitrage began to thrive at an unprecedented scale.  
The experience demonstrates that if economic activity is severely constrained by 
an overvalued exchange rate and foreign currency shortages, then provision of domestic 
currency funding, even at the lowest rates, cannot stimulate productive investment. 
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Companies instead compete for the limited foreign exchange on the parallel market using 
any funds they can secure. Hence the premium in the parallel market rose to levels that, 
by July 2001, were estimated to exceed the level required for export competitiveness by 
some 60 percent (on an inflation differential basis) (Robinson 2001). Faced with large 
negative real interest rates, individuals and companies had no incentive to save, and every 
incentive to spend on consumption and to speculate in shares and property. The dramatic 
surge in the stock market and recovery of property prices generated wealth effects (of 
asset inflation) that amplified spending and inflationary pressures. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that excessive purchases of some imported goods including luxuries were made 
and stockpiled while severe shortages of vital imports ensued (Ibid.).7  
In November 2002, the RBZ formally abandoned the Bank rate as a monetary 
policy tool and replaced it with the Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Rate. Preferential 
borrowing rates of 15 and 30 per cent were prescribed for exporters and productive 
entities, while all other rates were left to the market. Unlike the September 2000 policy 
which allowed productive lending to be made from statutory reserves, this time the 
preferential rates applied to market for loanable funds. Statutory reserve requirements 
were increased from 10 to 20 percent for time and savings deposits, and set at 50 percent 
for demand deposits. The growing need for government borrowing from the private 
sector to finance failing state enterprises and to procure foreign exchange for critical 
imports however kept the upward pressure on interest rates. As a result short-term money 
market rates started increasing sharply from about 30 percent in December 2002, to about 
600 – 900 percent by December 2003. 
 
5.1. Exchange Controls and Multiple Currency Practices 
 
One of the major responses of the RBZ to the currency crisis was abandonment of the 
managed float and resort to an administratively fixed exchange rate. Under the new 
regime, the currency was arbitrarily pegged against the U.S. dollar at a rate determined 
by the RBZ in consultation with the Minister of Finance. Although the Minister of 
Finance had the final authority of approval in the announcement of any exchange rate 
adjustment, experience dictates that this process had to go through the highest political 
office. Moreover, the government’s attitude towards exchange rate management was 
noticeably driven by fears that nominal devaluations would trigger an unacceptable and 
potentially permanent surge in inflation. Hence, exchange rate adjustments were very 
infrequent, while being subject to intense political scrutiny. With virtually no usable 
reserves, the exchange rate was not supported by any form of market-based intervention. 
The RBZ relied almost entirely on exchange controls to enforce compliance and direct 
foreign exchange inflows and transactions to the official market. The meagre reserves 
that were mainly obtained from export proceeds were subject to very tight rationing. 
Table 5 illustrates the series of measures that were introduced between 1998 and 2002. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Where the foreign exchange is rationed, the relatively wealthy and powerful may stand a better chance of 
obtaining it. This rationed foreign currency, often obtained at a high premium in the parallel market, is 
more likely to be used for the importation of luxury items than of basic necessities (Huizinga, 1995). 
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Table 5: Exchange Control Policy Measures: 1998 – 2002 
 
Policy Policy Directives 
February 
1998 
Surrender 
Requirements 
• Reintroduction of compulsory export surrender requirements with 
all exporters required to surrender 25% of their foreign exchange 
(forex) proceeds to the Reserve Bank for critical import payments 
such as electricity, fuel and official government financing  
August 
1998 
Capital restrictions on 
authorized dealers 
• Increase in capital requirements for foreign exchange bureaux from 
$US10,000 to $US100,000 and the suspension of the licencing of new 
ones. 
• Bureaux were allowed to purchase currency from an authorized dealer 
up to a maximum of 50% of capital in cash per month, without prior 
Exchange Control Approval. 
• All forward contracts were suspended and Authorized Dealers foreign 
exchange limits were reduced from a limit of US$5 million to US$2 
million or 10% of capital.  
January 
1999 
Restrictions on 
foreign currency 
account 
balances and 
transactions  
• Authorized dealers required to offload 50% of the FCA balances 
into the market 
• FCA balances to be retained for a maximum of 60 days after 
which they are offloaded onto the market 
• Export proceeds to be sold only to Authorized Dealers. 
• FCA funds restricted to financing own requirements. 
January 
2000 
Compulsory allocation 
of foreign currency 
balances to state 
entities 
•  Authorized Dealers to ensure that 50% of all payments made from 
export proceeds on any single day are allocated towards NOCZIM8, 
ZESA and debt service payments and preferential allocation to 
horticulture and gold exporters.  
• On any drawdown by an FCA holder, the equivalent should be set-aside 
for NOCZIM and ZESA.  
• Authorised Dealers allowed to accumulate foreign currency balances to 
a minimum amount of US$50 000, after which the funds should be 
transferred to FMB, MBCA and Stanchart on account of NOCZIM, 
ZESA, and PTC. 
March 
2000 
25% Surrender 
Requirements 
• Authorized dealers were required to set aside 25% of their currency 
payments towards priority areas set by RBZ. This was to cover fuel and 
electricity imports. 
June 2001 40% surrender 
requirements 
• The 25% export surrender requirement was increased to 40 % due to 
persistent shortages of forex to cover ZESA and NOCZIM imports. 
December 
2002 
100% surrender 
requirements 
• In attempt to control parallel market and boost official inflows, all forex 
bureaux de change closed with immediate effect. 
• Surrender requirements increased from 45% to 50%. 
• All foreign currency receipts from exports to be deposited with the RBZ, 
including exporters 50% entitlement. 
• Introducing priority list for approval of foreign exchange payments 
• Cancellation of exemptions on 40% retention for export processing zone 
companies and other special entitlements 
• All loan applications regardless of their level to be submitted to external 
loans coordinating committee. 
Compiled from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Exchange Control Orders 
 
                                                 
8
 The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority 
(ZESA) and the then Post and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), now TelOne, are responsible for 
the procurement and supply of petroleum , electricity and telecommunication services respectively. 
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Furthermore, in an attempt to support the producers of strategic exports such as 
gold, tobacco, and cotton, the RBZ introduced an array of “support prices” through 
multiple currency practices. Special subsidised domestic currency prices were set up for 
goods, which were traded under the direct marketing and supervision of the RBZ. This 
arrangement granted producers an exchange rate heavily depreciated relative to the 
official rate, albeit much lower than the parallel market rate. The effective exchange rates 
were often computed on a minimum cost recovery basis and entailed huge subsidies. In 
the process, the RBZ incurred heavy exchange rate losses as it had to sell the foreign the 
currency it received to the government at the overvalued official rate.  
In February 2003, the official exchange rate for most transactions was devalued 
by 93 percent, from Z$55 to Z$824 per US dollar. To avoid certain political fallout with 
government, the RBZ introduced a two-tier exchange rate system. Under the 
arrangement, the new rate would apply to all market transactions, while government and 
state entities continued to access foreign exchange at the old rate of Z$55 per U.S dollar. 
The two-tier arrangement of February 2003 was underpinned by the Exchange Control 
Order of December 2002. All foreign exchange transactions regardless of amount were to 
be subject to RBZ approval (RBZ 2003).  
 
5.3. The Foreign Exchange Auction System 
 
At the height of the foreign exchange crisis in December 2003, the RBZ introduced a 
Dutch foreign exchange auction system. The managed auction was intended to be a 
strategic measure to stabilize the foreign exchange market and control the parallel 
market. All foreign currency accounts held with commercial banks were migrated to the 
RBZ, and all foreign exchange transactions remained subject to RBZ approval. The 
launch of the foreign currency auction effected a 74 percent devaluation of the official 
exchange rate, from Z$824 to Z$3218 per US dollar at the first auction in January 2004. 
The dual official exchange rate system was retained. A fixed rate of Z$824 per US dollar 
was applicable to government transactions and official payments while all other 
transactions were subjected to the going auction rate. The following measures were 
introduced to support the auction system (RBZ 2003):  
i. Exporters were required to surrender 50 percent of their foreign currency earnings 
to the Reserve Bank to finance critical imports and government payments.  
ii. Of the 50 percent export proceeds they surrendered, half was to be immediately 
converted at the fixed official exchange rate of Z$824 per US dollar and the other 
half at the going auction rate. The funds would then be credited to the exporter’s 
account in local currency.  
iii. The remaining 50 percent of proceeds was to be deposited into the Exporter’s 
foreign currency account held with the RBZ for own use, subject to Exchange 
Control approval. This portion could only be retained in foreign currency for a 
maximum period of 60 days, after which the funds would be converted at the 
going rate and auctioned (Ibid).  
 
A notable short-term impact of the auction system was the immediate reduction in 
the parallel market premium. The parallel market rate appreciated by 40 percent from 
Z$6500 to Z$3000 per US dollar. In addition, the transfer of foreign currency accounts to 
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the RBZ largely curtailed the quasi-official participation of financial institution in the 
parallel market. Nonetheless, the market remained very active but operated now 
underground. In terms of exchange rate determination, the auction system turned out to 
be heavily controlled. The auction rate was predetermined. Bids that were considered 
high and, therefore, potential stimulants for inflation were rejected. Approval of bids and 
allocation of foreign exchange at the auction was subject to the RBZ priority list and 
Exchange Control approval. Bids for currency that would be used for purposes not 
considered of high priority were also rejected. Figure 8 shows total bids versus amount 
allotted and the percentage of bids that were rejected for the duration of the system.  
 
Figure 8: Total Bids and Amount Allotted on the Auction (US$ millions) 
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Data Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
A fundamental weakness of the auction system was that the demand for foreign 
exchange exceeded the available supply by far. With the major source of auction funds 
being export proceeds, exporters were also heavily penalized by the two-tier exchange 
rate system, and this further crippled official inflows. During the course of the auction 
system, exporters who needed to import inputs had to purchase the foreign exchange 
from the auction at a more depreciated rate (20 – 25 percent premium) than they had sold 
it to the RBZ. In addition, although the gradual relaxation of surrender requirements on 
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exporters resulted in a de facto depreciation of the official rate by mid-May 2004, it did 
not ease the critical foreign exchange shortages.  
An evaluation of the auction system shows that from the Auction 1, the amount of 
bids sharply increased from US$0.47 million to a peak of US$267 million on auction 
number 133. On the other hand, the amount allotted only increased from US$0.47 million 
to 12.5 million by auction number 171. By auction number 108, the percentage of 
rejected bids averaged over 97 percent, implying the acceptance of a paltry 3 percent of 
bids. After failing to cope with excessive demand, the auction system was abandoned in 
October 2005. It was replaced by the interbank rate which was to be determined freely in 
the market but subject to RBZ approval. The move resulted in the official exchange rate 
depreciating from an auction rate of Z$26,000 to $60,284/US dollar on the interbank 
market. However, a further 29 percent depreciation during the first month prompted the 
abandonment of the market based system. It was replaced by a transactions-weighted 
exchange rate wherein the rate was capped to adjust only by a 1 - 2 percent margin if 
transactions exceeded certain thresholds. Otherwise, it was to be periodically adjusted 
during occasional monetary policy announcements. 
 
5.4 Currency Reforms and Prospects for Stabilization in Retrospect 
 
In a monetary policy statement (MPS) issued by the RBZ on 31 July 2006, the Zimbabwe 
dollar was revalued by removing three zeros from the nominal exchange rate. The loss of 
value of the local currency, which eventually forced the currency reform, was mirrored in 
the extent of depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. In 1996, the exchange rate had been 
Z$10/US$. Since then, it was officially devalued by 99.996 percent to reach 
Z$250,000/US dollar in July 2006.  
The depreciation on the parallel market was even more dramatic with the rate 
reaching Z$650,000 within days of the announcement of currency reforms (Robinson 
2006). Interest rates were extremely high and volatile. Before the MPS, overnight rates at 
the central bank were set at 850-900 percent per annum. The 91-day TB rates had been of 
the order of 350 percent in the first half of 2006, but they were subsequently changed 
with unprecedented frequency. Banks were called upon to reduce their lending rates, and 
statutory reserve requirements were eased.  
As the overvaluation progressed, the authorities tried to alleviate the burden on 
exporters by providing producer subsidies and credit to the private sector that was funded 
by the Reserve Bank at highly concessional rates. The first of these, the Productive Sector 
Facility (PSF), was launched in February 2004 as an alternative to devaluing the 
currency. Under the PSF, companies borrowed at interest rates of 30 percent, later 
adjusted to 50 percent in July 2004. However, it was the expansion of these quasi-fiscal 
activities that mainly fuelled sharp increases in reserve money as well as broad money in 
2004–2005, feeding into the acute inflationary spiral (IMF 2005b).9  
Evidence also indicates that these facilities were not put to their intended use. 
Indications were that most of the cheap funds were diverted to speculative purposes in the 
foreign exchange market while some were invested in gilt-edged securities and short-
                                                 
9
 The RBZ in its defence of the quasi fiscal activities maintained that the provision of concessionary 
resources to the productive and export sectors of the economy arrested economic decline, stimulated 
productive activities and restored business confidence (RBZ 2005) 
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term money market instruments offering very high interest rates. In an environment 
where money market interest rates are multiples of the interest rates available to 
participants, it is more lucrative to deploy those funds to obtain the certain returns from 
money market investments rather than using them for the uncertain and more demanding 
purposes for which they were intended. The PSF was discontinued in July 2005 without 
any noticeable macroeconomic benefits but huge quasi-fiscal losses to the RBZ. 
However, those concessionary facilities that provided support for the government’s land 
reform program and state-owned enterprises were retained. A new concessionary facility 
was introduced for small-scale enterprises. Banks were also urged to match the amount 
which the RBZ had pledged to provide for this purpose (Robinson 2006).  
Overnight RBZ accommodation rates were reduced from 850 to 300 percent for 
secured, and from 900 to 350 percent for unsecured lending, which is equivalent to 1884 
-3157 percent per annum when compounded. Although the move ensured positive real 
interest rates on overnight loans, such a sharp drop in interest rates was likely to be 
perceived by the markets as a signal that inflation would continue to increase without 
restraint. Furthermore, the announced devaluation of the currency from Z$101,000/US$ 
to Z$250,000/US$ was largely perceived as inadequate relative to the prevailing parallel 
market rate of Z$650,000 per US dollar. Although some positive changes in the MPS 
allowed indefinite retention of 75 percent of export proceeds, the prospects were that, 
without the exchange rate adequately rewarding exporters, the shortages of foreign 
currency would persist and continue to spur imported inflation into the economy.  
Speculation, hoarding and parallel market activity are inevitable responses to distorted economic 
incentives. No amount of policing will eliminate such activities as long as the underlying policy 
framework is inadequate. Unfortunately, the cumulative result of ill-conceived, half-hearted 
stabilisation measures has resulted in an economic situation which is much more difficult to 
address than it was even a few years ago, when the crisis was already deemed to be all but 
intractable (Ibid.5). 
 
In retrospect, the developments in Zimbabwe show that as early as 1982, 2 years 
after independence, the economy was already developing critical structural 
disequilibrium problems, particularly with respect to the internal-external balance. But 
the authorities failed to address the problems that faced the economy then. Instead, the 
economy appears to have been sustained by running huge current account deficits that 
were mainly financed by donor funds, heavy external borrowing and strong recourse to 
the domestic financial system.  
The eventual abandonment of reform initiatives in the midst of a currency crisis 
and impending recession at the end of the 1990s further reveals the extremes to which a 
crisis that is driven by prolonged RER misalignment can degenerate. With extensively 
delayed macroeconomic adjustment, the authorities were left to contend with increasingly 
complicated and highly controversial options. The experience of Zimbabwe could justify 
the presumption that any stabilization approach which in the face of an exchange rate 
crisis fails to acknowledge the need to realign the exchange rate, and therefore restore the 
internal-external balance, faces bleak prospects under any circumstances. 
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has reviewed Zimbabwe’s exchange rate and monetary policies in relation to 
macroeconomic performance during the post independence period, 1980 up to 2006. The 
review provides a case study of the extent to which failure to implement credible policies 
can lead to severe exchange rate misalignment, currency crisis and full scale 
macroeconomic instability. The analysis further demonstrates that despite the initial 
economic boom and optimistic redistribution objectives that underlined post-
independence government policies, the economy had always remained stuck in long-term 
structural disequilibrium from as early as 1982 from which it never recovered.  
The inward looking policy regime that was supported by extensive controls on the 
economy failed to achieve its intended objectives of growth with equity. An initial short-
lived post independence boom was followed by serious foreign exchange shortages, 
declining investment, high budget deficits, unsustainable current account deficits, high 
levels of unemployment and lacklustre economic growth. On the other hand, the 
structural adjustment programme adopted in 1991 was stymied by drought and other 
inherent structural and institutional rigidities in the economy. This led to sustained 
exchange rate misalignment and a currency crisis at the end of 1997. By the end of the 
1990s, a macroeconomic crisis was unfolding that was characterized by a severe balance 
of payments crisis, a sharp recession and hyperinflation. The Government eventually 
backtracked on its policies – abandoning ESAP as it struggled to cope with the crisis. 
In a series of ad hoc monetary policy responses to the crisis, the government 
engaged in a vicious cycle of policy reversal. In particular, a sharp increase in interest 
rates was meant to stabilize the currency after the crash of 1997. However, very high 
interest rates in an import dependent economy with acute foreign exchange shortages did 
not stimulate investor confidence, but led to widespread financial market speculation and 
crowding out of productive investment.  
Follow-up efforts to reduce interest rates for the benefit of the productive sectors 
created highly negative real interest rates. Again, with the foreign exchange crisis and 
hyperinflation firmly entrenched, this shifted activity to the parallel market for foreign 
exchange. Rampant goods and property market speculation also occurred. Moreover, 
attempts to rely on the most extreme exchange control measures along with heavy 
financial repression elements created more distortions in the foreign exchange and 
financial markets.  
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